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What Counts as a Newtonian System?: The View from Norton’s Dome |
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Συγγραφέας: Samuel C. Fletcher Samuel C. Fletcher: What Counts as a Newtonian System?: The View from Norton’s Dome (pdf, 24 pages) If the force on a particle fails to satisfy a Lipschitz condition at a point, it relaxes one of the conditions necessary for a locally unique solution to the particle’s equation of motion. I examine the most discussed example of this failure of determinism—that of Norton’s dome—as well as two of my own. The best objections to the former hinge on the fact that the dome uses idealizations like perfect constraints to underwrite the failure of determinism. The best objections to my examples, however, are generally very different, with the exception of the Lipschitz condition, which I diagnose as the source of the failure of determinism. Unlike Norton, however, I do not seek to conclude that these examples are necessarily strong evidence that classical mechanics is not deterministic; rather, I want to emphasize the legitimacy of pragmatic considerations in deciding what legitimately counts as a Newtonian system. |
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