I want to answer two questions. The first is this: do anticipated emotions like regret, pride and guilt—emotions of first-personal assessment—have independent reason-giving force? That is, when making decisions about what to do, does the mere fact that we will, after the fact, experience these emotions give us a reason to act that is over and above the reasons we have arising from the value of the act itself and its (other) consequences? This question matters, I believe, for several reasons. One is that anticipating or dreading these emotions plays an enormous role in our deliberations, as we can see both in anecdotal appeals and in social science research sketched below. The rational warrant of such appeals is thus important to address. In addition, explaining the role of these emotions in our practical deliberations sheds light on the emotions themselves. I will argue that these after-the-fact emotions should carry little weight, and that to the extent that such appeals are a commonplace, there may be an interesting confusion between the heuristic and intrinsic significance of anticipated emotions. A central focus throughout will be the case of regret. The second question concerns emotional valence—how desirable or undesirable we find the experience of guilt, pride or regret. What is it that determines the valence of these feelings? Come to think of it, what determines the valence of feelings in general— of pain, for instance? I will argue that how attractive or repulsive these feelings are to us...