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| Transcendence, Dialogue, and Philosophical Eschatology in 20th Century Jewish Thought | |
| Συγγραφέας: Randy L. Friedman Randy L. Friedman: Transcendence, Dialogue, and Philosophical Eschatology in 20th Century Jewish Thought (pdf, 4 pages) The standard reading of the relationship between the work of Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas is no longer productive.  As the story goes, all three reject the traditional  idealist  philosophical  approach  in  philosophy  and  theology;  instead  of  viewing  that which  transcends  the  individual  through  reason  with  the  goal  of  comprehension,  each  offers  a distinctive  approach  to  the  reconstruction  of  the  transcendent.    Most  scholars  argue  that Rosenzweig and Levinas reject Buber’s ethical humanism, because it does not adequately respect the distance between the individual and her ‘other.’  This casting of the tradition of 20th century Jewish thought must be reconstructed.  I propose to read Rosenzweig and Buber against Levinas, arguing  that  they  maintain  a  deep  concern  for  the  redemptive  tasks  of  a  community  the possibility  of  which  Levinas  rejects  outright.    My  work  presents  a  new  genealogy  which  will serve to ground a book project on the conception of the divine in 20th century Jewish thought, Gods of Becoming, in which I offer a detailed study of the philosophical roots and methodologies of these three central figures. This  paper  complements  my  most  recent  writings  on  the  reconstruction  of  the  central theological categories of creation, revelation, and redemption in modern Jewish thought.  I am currently  completing  a  series  of  articles  on  Rosenzweig,  Buber,  and  Levinas.    In  the  first,  I compare the approaches of Levinas and Husserl on the question of alterity and responsibility.  In this  piece  I  challenge  Levinas’s  critique  of  Husserl,  and  the  alternative  he  offers  to  Husserl’s conception  of  alter-ego.    Levinas  does  not  think  that  consideration  of  another  person  as essentially  similar  is  an  adequate  grounding  for  ethical  relation.    Instead,  he  builds  his... | |
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