Under what conditions do some objects compose something?1 The intuitive answer to the question is “sometimes”. When a hammer head and hammer handle are firmly attached to one another, they plausibly compose something, namely, a hammer. Before the handle and head were attached to one another, they plausibly did not compose anything. The universalist answer is “always”: for any non-overlapping objects, those objects compose something. The handle and head compose something even before they come into contact. There is even something composed of your nose and the Eiffel Tower—something partly located in Paris and partly located on your face. Despite such counterintuitive implications, universalism is widely accepted among metaphysicians, and its popularity is in large part due to the argument from vagueness.2 The argument from vagueness was first advanced by David Lewis and was later elaborated and defended by Theodore Sider.3 It runs as follows: (A1) If universalism is false, then there can be a sorites series for composition. (A2) Every sorites series for composition must contain either borderline cases of composition or a cut-off with respect to composition. (A3) There cannot be borderline cases of composition. (A4) There cannot be cut-offs with respect to composition.