One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based or internalist view, only one’s desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to act.1 On the value-based view, the strongest form of externalism about reasons, reasons are instead provided by the objective evaluative facts, and never by our desires.2 Lying in between, the hybrid or weak externalist view recognizes both sources.3 Similarly, there are desire-based and non-desired-based theories about two other phenomena: pleasure and welfare. It has been argued, and is natural to think, that holding a desire-based theory about either pleasure or welfare commits one to recognizing that desires do provide reasons for action – i.e., commits one to abandoning the value-based theory of reasons.4 The purpose of this paper is to show that this is not so. All of the following can be true: pleasure and welfare provide reasons; pleasure and welfare are to be understood in terms of desire; desires never provide reasons, in the relevant way.