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The Consequences of War |
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Συγγραφέας: Thomas Hurka Thomas Hurka: The Consequences of War (pdf, 47 pages) A standing temptation for moral philosophers is to approach their subject in a primarily intellectual way. Many of us are initially drawn to it by the pressing human issues it raises, both about concrete moral problems and, more generally, about how we should live. But over time we can come to care more about making clever ethical arguments or formulating new theories or detecting new subtleties. Our engagement with moral questions can become the more purely cerebral one found in, say, metaphysics or epistemology. Jonathan Glover’s writings are an antidote to this temptation. For alongside their philosophical acuity they always retain a profound interest in moral questions as moral, and a deep emotional engagement with them. He never subordinates ethical substance to intellectual flash. One reflection of this engagement is his willingness to explore the empirical issues relevant to a given moral issue, even though for many philosophers doing so is less prestigious than spinning abstract theories. Another is his strong focus on what must be central to any plausible morality, namely human well-being and how acts and policies affect 1 people for good or ill. The result is an approach to moral questions that is broadly if not exclusively consequentialist, evaluating policies largely for their effects on human and other happiness. This approach is evident in his writings about the morality of war, which he treats theoretically in Causing Death and Saving Lives and discusses from a more practical point of view, concerned to avert its horrors, in Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century.1 Though the former discussion gives some weight to individual autonomy, its watchword is Bertrand Russell’s insistence on a “vital realization of the consequences of acts,” and it therefore sets aside such deontological distinctions as between doing and allowing harm, intending and foreseeing harm,2 and even between soldiers and civilians. Throughout its focus is on what war will do to people. As Glover recognizes, this broadly consequentialist approach is revisionist. Both everyday thought about the morality of war and the international law governing it derive from the Catholic tradition of just war theory, which is avowedly deontological, attaching weight to just the moral distinctions Glover ignores... |
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