The essays in this book discuss a wide variety of topics: from cognitivism about instrumental rationality (Michael Bratman) to the role of regret in practical reasoning (Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson), and from the difference between practical and epistemic reasons (Joseph Raz) to wide-scope accounts of practical conditionals (James Dreier). This makes it difficult to say anything about the book as a whole. I can only make some remarks about two of the essays. In “Mackie’s motivational argument”, Philip Clark discusses J. L. Mackie’s arguments from queerness. According to this argument, if there are moral properties like rightness and wrongness, these properties must motivate anyone who recognises them to act in accordance with them. Since no other property is connected to motivation in this way, Mackie claimed, this makes moral properties too queer to exist. He took this argument to support his famous error theory about moral judgements, according to which all moral judgements are false. As Clark notes, this argument fails if there can be amoralists: people who make moral judgements but who are not motivated to act in accordance with them. More precisely, Clark takes amoralists to be people who have “beliefs, even correct ones, about what morality requires” (p. 204), but who think that there is no reason to act in accordance with these beliefs and who are therefore not motivated to act in accordance with them. He argues that, though Mackie will have to give up his error theory about moral judgements if there can be amoralists, he can then adopt an error theory about what Clark calls ‘the moral outlook’ instead. According to this error theory about the moral outlook, even though some moral judgements are true, amoralists are right to think that there is no reason to act in accordance with these judgements. Though this is an interesting proposal, I wonder whether having “beliefs, even correct ones, about what morality requires” is the same thing as making moral.....