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| Why I am not a Consequentialist | |
| Συγγραφέας: David S. Oderberg David S. Oderberg: Why I am not a Consequentialist (pdf, 9 pages) This is an introductory talk on why I am not a consequentialist. I am not going to go into the details of consequentialist theory, or to compare and contrast different versions of consequentialism. Nor am  I  going to present all the reasons  I  am not a consequentialist, let alone all the reasons why you should not be one. All I want to do is focus on some key problems that in my view, and the view of many others, make consequentialism a totally unacceptable moral theory â a theory about what is right, what is good, or obligatory, or forbidden, or permissible, or praiseworthy. So  let  me  begin  by  giving  a  basic  definition  of  consequentialism,  one  all supporters  of  the  view  can  agree  on.  Consequentialism  is  the  theory  that  the fundamental aim of morality is to maximize value. Now I was tempted to say âsole aimâ,  but  some  consequentialists  will  disagree  with  that.  They  might  hold,  for instance, that one of the aims of morality is to abide by certain rules, or to cultivate certain virtues. But for them, what gives obedience to a rule or the cultivation of a virtue  its  point  is  that,  ultimately,  such  behaviour  maximizes  value.  So  although maximizing  value  might  not  be  the  sole  aim  of  morality  â  the  sole  answer  to  the question  âWhat  should  I  do  to  be  good?â  and  similar  questions  â  still  it  is  the fundamental aim of morality, and all other kinds of decision, action, and so on, derive their  justification  by  reference  to  it.  For  my  purposes,  then,  the  difference  between âsoleâ and âfundamentalâ is merely terminological. Now the first thing that might occur to someone is a pair of simple questions. Why  should  anyone  believe  that  the  fundamental  aim  of  morality  is  to  maximize value? What intuitive force does the idea even have in the first place? These are good questions.  I  was  a  consequentialist  once,  and  I  donât  think  I  ever  posed  them  to myself.  I  just  took  it  as  understood  that  since  so  many  philosophers  were consequentialists, and since so many of my fellow students were as well, then even if it were ultimately shown not to be true, the maximization thought (as I will call it) was at least the obvious place to start when one did ethics... | |
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