My aim in this paper is to investigate both the phenomenology and science of agency. In its proper sense, I understand agency to depend on the agent’s consciousness of agency. That is, if someone or something causes something else to happen, that person or thing is not an agent (even if they might be a cause) if they do not know in some way that they have caused it to happen. A hurricane may cause the electric system to fail, but we would not attribute agency to the hurricane in what I take to be the normal use of the term. The kind of conscious knowledge involved in agency does not have to be of a very high order; it could be simply a matter of a very thin phenomenal awareness, and in most cases it is just that. If this is correct, the questions are, what do we mean by an experience or a sense of agency, and how is it generated. The remainder of this paper addresses these questions and attempts to show how complex these questions actually are.