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| Strengthening the Case for Knowledge From Falsehood | |
| Συγγραφέας: Branden Fitelson Branden Fitelson: Strengthening the Case for Knowledge From Falsehood (pdf, 84K) 1. Background: Warfield’s Examples of KFF Recently, several authors have offered examples of inferential knowledge, which is (at least prima facie) based on a falsehood. In this note, I will focus my attention on the following example, which is presented and discussed by Warfield [3, 408]:  I have a 7pm meeting and extreme confidence in the accuracy of my fancy watch. Having lost track of the time and wanting to arrive on time for the meeting, I look carefully at my watch. I reason: ‘It is exactly 2:58pm; therefore I am not late for my 7pm meeting’. Again I know my conclusion, but as it happens it’s exactly 2:56pm, not 2:58pm.  For Warfield, an example counts as a case of knowledge from falsehood (KFF) just in case both of the following conditions are satisfied by the example [3, 408]:  (i) the example involves inferential knowledge of a conclusion q. (ii) the example involves a false relevant premise p.  Warfield considers various | |
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