In his book Liberty Worth the Nd?72€,1 Gideon Yaffe has provided an interpretation of Lock:-z's account of moral responsibility according to which it bears important affinities with the views of contemporary theorists Harry lirankfurt and Susan Wolf. On Yaffe’s reading, Locke, like Frankfurt and Wolf separates moral responsibility from the ability to have acted otherwise; like Wolf, Locke associates freedom with the dependency ofone’s choices on the good. I am going to argue that Yaffe’s interpretation of the key passages underlying his interpretation is suspect. We get a very different perspective in trying to interpret the points Locke is trying to make if instead of looking forward to Frankfurt and Wolf we look backward to Aquinas. The first part of this paper will be concerned with an investi~ gation of Locl<e’s example of the man in the locked room and the closely related example ofthe paralytic. These two examples are used by Locke to illustrate his understanding of the notion of vol— untariness. The paralytic example, I believe, is the clearer of the two. Although I will be presenting alternatives to Yaffe’s reading of the example ofthe man inthe locked room, I will also suggest strategies by which his reading can be defended, and in the end I will conclude that the choice among the alternative interpretations is underdeterrnined by the text. The second part ofthe paper will be concerned with Yaffe’s account of what he calls ‘the Elusive...