Contextualists, about a given type of expression, claim that the contribution that expression makes to the content or truth value of an assertion depends on the context in which this assertion is made, whereas invariants deny this. Recently, arguments have been given favoring invariantism for a number of expressions for which contextualism had previously been favored, including predicates of personal taste (e.g., ‘tasty,’ ‘dreamy’),1 epistemic modals (‘might,’ ‘must’),2 deontic modals (‘ought,’ ‘may’),3 probability operators (‘probably,’ ‘certainly’),4 and indicative conditionals,5 among others.6 Invariantists have prominently argued that their view is preferable to contextualism because only their view accounts for disagreement and closely related phenomena. For invariantism seems to allow, correctly, that Popeye and Bluto disagree when Popeye says ‘spinach is tasty’ and Bluto says ‘spinach is not tasty,’ whereas contextualism seems to predict that they do not thereby disagree, since the proposition Popeye affirms differs from the proposition Bluto denies. More generally, if we define a contested sentence as a sentence containing one of the contested expressions (‘tasty’, ‘might’, ‘ought’ etc.) but no other contextsensitive expressions, invariantism seems to entail that the following is true, whereas contextualism seems to entail that it is false: