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| Is knowledge the most general factive stative attitude? | |
| Συγγραφέας: Cesare Cozzo Cesare Cozzo: Is knowledge the most general factive stative attitude? (pdf, 7 pages) Gilbert  Harman  has  written:  “Williamson‟s  Knowledge  and  its  Limits  is the  most  important  philosophical  discussion  of  knowledge  in  many  years.  It  sets the  agenda  for  epistemology  for  the  next  decade  and  beyond”  (Harman  2002,  p. 417). Timothy Williamson‟s ground-breaking proposal is that knowing is  “merely a state of  mind”. In other  words, for every proposition  p “there is a state of  mind being  in  which  is  necessary  and  sufficient  for  knowing  p”  (Williamson  2000,  p. 21). When first advanced, Williamson‟s view ran contrary to the general trend. The “standard  view”  (ibidem)  was  that  “believing  is  merely  a  state  of  mind,  but... | |
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