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| 3 Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics | |
| Συγγραφέας: Craig Callender Craig Callender: 3 Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics (pdf, 22 pages) Philosophy of science has a complicated relationship with metaphysics.  Studying topics such as the nature of causation, laws of nature and space-time, it clearly engages in activities that merit classi cation as metaphysics. Yet the academic discipline itself was born in opposition to metaphysics. The positi vists were united in a shared distrust of metaphysics. Their suspicion ran so deep as to motivate a search for a demarcation between science and non- science, and science and speculative metaphysics in particular. Even today, philosophy of science  appears  caught  in  what  Einstein  (1933)  called  the  '‘eternal  antithesis between the two inseparable components of our knowledge -– the empirical and  the  rational'’  (p.  271).  It  wants  to  employ  metaphysical  speculation,  but impressed  with  the  methods  of  the  subject  it  studies,  it  fears  overreaching. Philosophy  of  science  thus  tries  to  walk  a   ne  line  between  scienti cally grounded meta physics and its more speculative cousins. Here I will try to dra   some of the contour of this boundary, along the way introducing the reader to some of the relevant issues. Doing so is critical today, for we are in the midst of a major collision between two very large forces in philosophy  that  has  a  signi cant  bearing  on  metaphysics.  Whereas  metaphysics  and  science  were  once  one  and  the  same   eld,  natural  philosophy, today there is a worrisome divide between the two. This separation is no doubt due to developments within both science and metaphysics. Physics, for instance, in part due to its distribution of incentives since World War II, is far less '‘philosophical'’ than it used to be (Holton 1986). Nineteenth-century  physicists  debated  the  reality  of  the  electric   eld,  but today  few  physicists  debate  the  updated  counterparts  of  this  question  for gauge   elds.  The  same  goes  for  the  measurement  problem  in  quantum mechanics. Sometimes dubbed the '‘reality problem'’, the issue is really about the proper ontology suited to quantum theory, and it'’s hard to imagine a question  of  comparable  importance  in  previous  times  being  shunted  aside  as  it o  en is today... | |
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