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Authority and Reason-Giving |
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Συγγραφέας: David Enoch David Enoch: Authority and Reason-Giving (doc, 30 pages) Arguably, you have authority over your 7-year-old son. This means, perhaps among other things, that you can, by your mere say-so, create duties for your son. You just have to tell him to go to his room, and suddenly he is under a duty to go to his room, a duty that just until a minute ago he did not have. Suddenly, by not going to his room – something that until just a minute ago was perfectly permissible for him to do – he will be acting wrongly. How did this magic happen? Similar magic seems to be going on whenever someone possesses legitimate authority. The state arguably possesses such authority over its citizens (or at least some states do, on some matters, some of the time). My dean arguably possesses such authority over me (regarding some professional matters). And perhaps also the passenger who seizes the initiative in an emergency, and starts to give instructions thereby coordinating the actions of the more panicked passengers (thereby perhaps saving lives): At least after some time has passed and people have been following her instructions for a while, she seems to be able to do similar normative magic with her words. |
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