This article suggests first that the concept of interpersona l recognition be understoo d in a multidimensiona l (as opposed to one-dimensional) , practical (as opposed to symbolic), and strict (as opposed to broad) way. Second, it is argued that due recognitio n be seen as a reason-governe d response to evaluative features, rather than all normativity and reasons being seen as generated by recognition. This can be called a response-model , or, more precisely, a value-base d model of due recognition . A further suggestion is that there is a systematic basis for distinguishin g three dimensions of recognition, depending on whether recognitio n is given to someone qua a person, qua a certain kind of person, or qua a certain person. Finally, it is argued that recognitio n is a necessary condition of personhood , but whether it is of direct or indirect relevance depends on our theories of personhoo d (social vs. capacity-theory ) and practical identity (dialogical definition model vs. featuremodel). Despite the apparent opposition , it is shown that interpersona l recognitio n is...