There has been an understandable backlash of late against what Jeffrie Murphy (2003) has aptly called ‘boosterism’ about forgiveness — the view that advocates forgiveness of, and reconciliation with, those who have wronged you as the only proper response for victims, a response which will heal their wounds, and which will enable us all to move on from the offence. Boosterism carries with it the implication that those who fail to drop all negative feelings towards their persecutors and embrace them in fellowship are morally deficient. I Critics of this view typically doubt whether it is always a good thing to forgive people who have wronged you. Shouldn’t we withhold forgiveness unless and until they repent of their actions? Isn’t the maintenance of anger at wrongdoers, especially ones who don’t regret their offences, sometimes morally justified? Surely there’s such a thing as cheap, facile forgiveness, forgiveness which is objectionable because it is just too easy to be morally worthwhile? We approach these questions from the standpoint of a commitment to unconditional forgiveness. That is, we hold that there is always good reason to forgive an offender, whether or not he has repented of his wrongful actions. Such forgiveness, when given for the right reasons, is always admirable. Since we have defended this view elsewhere, we shall not rehearse those arguments again here} But on the face of it our view seems to be wide open to the objections raised against boosterism. In this paper, we argue against those objections. Unconditional forgiveness need not be docile, supine, or facile. In particular, we shall try to show four things. Firstly, forgiveness is compatible with the maintenance of certain kinds of anger and other negative feelings towards perpetrators. Secondly, while forgiveness is always appropriate, even where the offender is unrepentant, forgiveness is different from reconciliation, and there are cases where reconciliation is not appropriate...