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I. Hegel and Metaphysics |
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Συγγραφέας: James Kreines James Kreines: I. Hegel and Metaphysics (html, 119K) Recent debates about Hegel’s theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question: what is Hegel talking about? On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organization of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza’s metaphysical monism, according to which the organized whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. [1] On the other hand, proponents of ‘non metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel’s topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel’s positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fundamental being, but rather ‘forms of thought’ akin to Kant’s categories and the objectivity, legitimacy, or normative authority of those forms of thought. |
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