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On Sense and Reference |
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Συγγραφέας: Gottlob Frege Gottlob Frege: On Sense and Reference (pdf, 119K) Equalityl gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begr@sc/ary} I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: 4 = 4 and 4 = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; 4 = 4 holds 4 priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of the form 4 = b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established 4 priori. The discovery that the rising sun is not new every morning, but always the same, was one of the most fertile astronomical discoveries. Even to·day the identification of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter of course. Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘4’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that 4 = b could not differ from 4 = 4 (i.e. provided 4 = b is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself and indeed one in which each thing stands to itself but to no other thing. What is intended to be said by 4 = b seems to be that the signs or names ‘4’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation... |
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