Epistemic Comparativism: A contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions


Συγγραφέας: Jonathan Schaffer


Jonathan Schaffer: Epistemic Comparativism: A contextualist semantics for knowledge ascriptions (pdf, 469K)
Knowledge ascriptions seem context sensitive. If Ann and Ben are wondering who stole the diamonds, and Ann finds Claire’s fingerprints all over the safe, then Ann may say: 1. I know that Claire stole the diamonds Ben would likely agree. Ann’s claim would seem true. Yet if Ann and Ben are wondering instead what Claire stole from the safe, and Ann finds Claire’s fingerprints all over the safe, then Ann should not yet say 1. If she said this, Ben would likely disagree. Her claim would seem false.





  





© 2002-2013 filosofia.gr - Επιτρέπεται η αναδημοσίευση του περιεχομένου της ιστοσελίδας εφόσον αναφέρεται ευκρινώς η πηγή του.

Κατασκευη ιστοσελιδων