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Davidson, First Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics |
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Συγγραφέας: Steven Gross Steven Gross: Davidson, First Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics (doc, 99K) Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for a substantial fragment of a natural language and sketches a procedure—radical interpretation—that, drawing on such evidence, could confirm such a theory. Bracketing refinements (e.g., those introduced to accommodate context-sensitivity), the truth-theory allows the derivation, from finite axioms, of theorems of the form ‘S is true in L iff p’ for all sentences of the target language L, where ‘p’ is replaced by a sentence that can be said to interpret the target sentence S. The radical interpreter confirms such a theory in application to some speaker if, while thus interpreting the speaker’s sentences, she can also attribute to the speaker attitudes that, given what sentences the speaker holds true in what circumstances, plausibly optimize her rationality and possession of true beliefs. Radical interpretation, Davidson maintains, underdetermines truth-theory. What’s more, in his view, such underdetermination amounts to indeterminacy. The evidence available to a radical interpreter, given the constraints to which radical interpretation is subject, exhausts the relevant semantic facts, in the sense both of determining them and rendering them epistemically determinable. (Henceforth ‘(E)’ for ‘exhaustion’.) Thus, truththeories equally well confirmed by all the evidence equally well capture all the facts to be Capiufedlll This is so even if the truth-theories provide, for the same sentence, truth-conditions that from the interpreter’s perspective are incompatible or differ in some other semantically relevant way... |
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