Kant's Critical philosophy is notorious for its terminological ambiguity and apparent inconsistency. The interpretive confusion that often results is at least a contributing factor to the conclusion of many commentators, such as Strawson, that large chunks of Kant's System (e.g., his 'transcendental idealism') are 'unintelligible' and 'incoherent'. [1] Yet I believe, with Kant [Kt1: Axxi], that if his works are approached with 'the patience and impartiality of a judge' (and perhaps even with 'the benevolent assistance of a fellow worker '), rather than with a set of analytical tools with which to dissect his every sentence, then almost all of his theories can be understood in surprisingly simple and consistent terms. Accordingly, I shall make a further step in this chapter towards the substantiation of this supposition by interpreting and interrelating some of the fundamental epistemological distinctions which serve to structure all three Critiques.