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| Truth and Internalizability | |
| Συγγραφέας: Kevin Scharp Kevin Scharp: Truth and Internalizability (pdf, 51 pages) The  vast  majority  of  approaches  to  the  liar  paradox  generate  new paradoxes  that  are  structurally  similar  to  the  liar  (often  called  revenge  paradoxes).    There  is  a  complex  group  of  issues  surrounding  revenge paradoxes, the expressive powers of natural languages, and the adequacy of  approaches  to  the  liar.    My  goal  is  to  provide  a  precise  framework against  which  these  issues  can  be  formulated  and  discussed.    The centerpiece of this framework is the notion of internalizability: a semantic theory is internalizable for a language if and only if there exists an extension of  the  language  such  that  (i)  the  theory  is  expressible  in  that  extended language, and (ii) the theory assigns meanings to all the relevant sentences of that extended language.  The framework is applied to three examples from  the  literature:  Reinhardt  and  McGee  on  theories  that  require expressively richer metalanguages, Field on revenge-immunity, and Gupta on semantic self-sufficiency. | |
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