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Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate? |
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Συγγραφέας: Elizabeth Harman Elizabeth Harman: Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate? (pdf, 36 pages) Gideon Rosen has argued for the following Broad Conclusion: A person who acts wrongly is blameworthy for so acting only if the action itself is a case of clear-eyed akrasia or the action results from a case of clear-eyed akrasia.1 While the Broad Conclusion is stated in terms of akrasia, its main upshot is regarding moral knowledge and moral ignorance. An akratic action is one done in the belief that one should act differently. Someone who acts wrongly while ignorant that he should act differently is not acting akratically. The Broad Conclusion implies that someone who acts wrongly without believing that he should act differently is blameworthy only if his action results from a case of clear-eyed akrasia: that is, only if it results from some earlier behavior performed in the full belief that it... |
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